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AN ARCTIC TREATY: A SOLUTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE OVER THE 
POLAR REGION
Molly Watson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The melting of the polar ice caps in the Arctic region has resulted in an
international battle over Arctic territory and its vast natural resources.  Five
Arctic nations are claiming rights to overlapping territory and there is no
evident legal resolution to their competing interests.  Four of these five
states have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and are operating within its framework in their attempts to
solidify their territorial claims.  However, for some, their trust in that law
seems limited, as evidenced by their more traditional approaches to
claiming land.  The fifth nation, the United States, has yet to ratify
UNCLOS, thus excluding itself from the legal framework within which the
other nations are operating.  Yet, even were the United States to join the
treaty, UNCLOS remains an imperfect framework for governance of the icy
northern region.  This Comment examines the jurisdictional claims made
by each of the five Arctic States and the support for those claims.  It then
proposes an Arctic treaty, modeled in part after the Antarctic Treaty, as a
resolution of the dispute in consideration of the objectives of each State and
the Arctic’s unique environment.
The remainder of Part I discusses the event triggering the international
battle for the Arctic, the melting of the polar ice caps, and the consequent
development of the region into one of increased global importance.  Part II
examines the perspectives of each State involved in the dispute, their
factual and legal claims, and the policies underlying those claims.  Finally,
Part III offers suggestions for resolving the dispute through an Arctic treaty.
The proposal of an Arctic treaty as the appropriate framework for
governing the region has been debated among scholars, with some
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1. Scott Borgerson, An Ice-Cold War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A19 [hereinafter
Borgerson I]. See generally Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal
Issues in Arctic Sovereignty, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 323 (2008).
2. John B. Bellinger, Treaty on Ice, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 24, 2008, at 6; see also
Mark Jarashow, Michael B. Runnels & Tait Svenson, UNCLOS and the Arctic: The Path of
Least Resistance, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1587, 1650 (2007) (indicating that “[w]hile such
a treaty would solve many of the environmental issues in the region, it might not have a
strong enough effect”).
3. The Arctic Council, http://arctic-council.org/article/about (last visited Dec. 30, 2008).
4. Id.
5. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP), GLOBAL OUTLOOK FOR ICE
& SNOW 9 (UNEP/Grid-Arendal ed., 2007), available at http://www.unep.org/geo/geo_ice/
PDF/full_report_LowRes.pdf.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 12.
suggesting its vitalness1 and others concluding it is either unnecessary,
undesirable, or impracticable.2  However, the debate has not yet led to an
in-depth examination of what such a treaty must entail.  After discussing
the usefulness of the Antarctic Treaty as a model, this Comment proposes
the necessary components of an Arctic treaty that meet the objectives of the
States involved, while also addressing additional issues unique to this
northernmost region. 
A. The Arctic Is Melting
The Arctic is a vast region that encompasses over one-sixth of global
landmass, and spans over thirty million square kilometers and twenty-four
time zones.3  Its population of approximately four million people includes
dozens of indigenous peoples and languages.4  Despite its substantial size,
the Arctic has historically been largely ignored by the rest of the world due
to its inaccessibility.  In recent years, however, the global community has
begun to take notice of this northern expanse as the warming temperatures
melt the polar ice caps, making the region increasingly less remote.  
Overall Arctic temperatures have been rising at almost twice the global
rate.5  In the last three decades, the amount of Arctic sea ice present in
September has declined by 8.9% per decade, and the amount in March has
dropped by 2.5% per decade.6  Annual total loss from the Greenland Ice
Sheet more than doubled in the last decade of the twentieth century, and
may have doubled again by 2005.7  Since the 1950s, sea-ice thickness has
been decreasing in parts of the Arctic, and both the extent and thickness of
the ice are projected to continue to decline to the point that, according to
some scholars, the Arctic Ocean may experience ice-free summers by 2100
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8. Id. at 11.
9. Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining
International Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 MO.ENVTL.L.&POL'YREV. 1, 19 (2005).
10. Clifford Krauss et al., The Big Melt: As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams of
Treasure Abound, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A1.
11. Jarashow, Runnels & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1590.
12. Jon Jacobson, Remarks, Legal Regimes of the Arctic, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
315, 322 (1988).
13. Frants Dalgaard-Knudsen, The Greenlandic Offshore Area, 5 N.Y. INT’LL. REV. 63,
68 (1992).
14. Mike Perry, Rights of Passage: Canadian Sovereignty and International Law in the
Arctic, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 657, 660 (1997).
15. Christopher Mark Macneill, Note, Gaining Command & Control of the Northwest
Passage: Strait Talk on Sovereignty, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 355, 360 (2007); Scott Borgerson,
Breaking the Ice Up North, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A21 [hereinafter Borgerson II].
16. Krauss et al., supra note 10, at A1.
or sooner.8  Other researchers forecast that the Arctic will be ice-free during
the summer months as soon as 2050.9  An ice-free Arctic would mean the
opening up of a sea that is almost five times the size of the Mediterranean.10
Experts suggest that this dramatic warming trend is a result of human-
induced global warming coupled with the region’s propensity for
magnifying global environmental changes.11
In the past, the ice covering the Arctic Ocean has presented a
significant barrier to human use.  One commentator asserts that, if not for
the ice, “the Arctic Ocean would undoubtedly be one of the busiest seas in
the history of civilization, rivaling the . . . Mediterranean.”12  Currently,
only coastal regions can be navigated, and even then only by ice-breaker
ships during certain times of the year, which leaves the remainder of the
Arctic Ocean reachable only by submarine.13  However, as further advances
are made in technology and in the development of ice-breaking equipment,
these waterways may become accessible year-round.14  One result of an ice-
free Arctic is the opening up of a new shipping route between Europe and
Asia known historically as the Northwest Passage.  Access to the Northwest
Passage could cut five thousand miles—or up to a week of sailing time—
off circumpolar sea voyages, as these ships must otherwise travel via the
Panama Canal.15  It is important to consider, however, that though seasonal
melting may make the region more accessible in some respects, such
melting will also result in more icebergs, creating new hurdles to access.16
B.  Value of the Arctic
While the Arctic region is certainly valued for its potential shipping
routes, it is also coveted for its onshore and offshore oil and gas reserves,
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17. Dubner, supra note 9, at 6, 13.
18. Michael Piskur, The Arctic and Future Energy Resources, in POWER AND INTEREST
NEWS REPORT (2006), available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report
_id=544&language_id=1.
19. Andrew King, Note, Thawing a Frozen Treaty: Protecting United States Interests in
the Arctic with a Congressional-Executive Agreement on the Law of the Sea, 34 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 329, 330 (2007).
20. Perry, supra note 14, at 660.
21. Krauss et al., supra note 10, at A1 (quoting Christopher Weafer, Energy Analyst with
Alfa Bank in Moscow).  
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. 
26. E.J. Stewart et al., Sea Ice in Canada’s Arctic: Implications for Cruise Tourism, 60
ARCTIC 370, 372 (2007) (noting that the “2006 summer cruise season . . . recorded the
highest number of cruise vessels (twenty-two) ever seen in Canadian Arctic waters”).
as well as its large coal reserves.17  Historically, most of these reserves have
been offshore under thick ice and deep water, making them either
inaccessible or logistically “too costly and dangerous to extract.”18  The
United States Geologic Survey has estimated that a quarter of the world’s
undiscovered oil and gas resources are located in the Arctic.19  Access to
these resources could dramatically change trade relations in the world,
since “[r]ecoverable reserves of crude oil [in the Arctic] are estimated
at . . . almost half the supply of OPEC nations . . . [and] inevitable shortages
could make the North a world resource provider early in the [twenty-first]
century.”20  In effect, this may result in a shift in energy alliances, such that
Russia in particular may be positioned as a “more effective counterbalance
to OPEC.”21  Even before the polar ice caps began melting at such an
exponential rate, Arctic nations had already begun reaching farther North
in pursuit of these valuable natural resources in spite of the dangers.22
In addition to opening shipping routes and access to natural resources,
further benefits of the melting Arctic include access to commercial fisheries
and new cruise ship destinations.23  With warmer water temperatures, in
just a few decades, waters that have historically been largely untouched
could become profitable fishing grounds.24  The dramatic increase in fish
stocks in Arctic waters as species move farther north may bring an
extensive commercial fishing operation to the region.25  Additionally, with
melting ice and increasingly navigable waters, the tourism industry stands
to profit from Arctic warming.  The number of cruise ships navigating
Arctic waters has already begun to increase in recent years.26  An area
chiefly ignored by much of the world through most of history, the Arctic is
now poised to become a significantly more active and developed region.
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27. Dubner, supra note 9, at 12, 13.
28. Jacobson, supra note 12, at 319.
29. Id.
30. Christopher C. Joyner, Ice-Covered Regions in International Law, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 213, 217 (1991).
31. Dubner, supra note 9, at 13.
32. Piskur, supra note 18.
33. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective, http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm (last visited Apr.
2, 2009).
While it is clear that there are considerable economic gains to be made
as a result of warmer temperatures in the Arctic, the Arctic’s environment
is also extremely valuable and may be at risk if the current melting pattern
continues.  The Arctic is “a very vulnerable and fragile ecosystem,” rich not
only in energy resources, but also in various forms of wildlife.27  Thus, as
the Arctic continues to melt and becomes increasingly developed, it will be
important to balance any economic growth against protection of the
Arctic’s unique environment. 
C.  Status of International Law
Historically, there was legal uncertainty as to whether the icy Arctic
region should be classified as ocean, and thus beyond the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of the States, or whether it ought to be considered land.28  This
determination was largely unimportant in the past given that there was only
minimal human activity within the region;29 however, with growing human
interest in the area, determining the legal classifcation of the icy region has
grown more critical.  The Arctic has come to be considered ocean under
international law.30  Yet the legal ramifications for the region are further
complicated by the lack of a clear definition of the Arctic’s boundaries.
This uncertainty as to the region’s limits has led to multiple approaches to
defining the Arctic expanse, adding “further [to the] discourse amongst
those vying for its resources.”31  In addition to the specific claims of
sovereignty made by certain Arctic States, segments of the Arctic,
including the North Pole, have traditionally been considered international
territory.32  This pronounced uncertainty over both the boundaries and the
status of Arctic territory contribute significantly to the disagreement among
the States involved in the dispute.
In response to this uncertainty, the international community has
endorsed the UNCLOS, which represents its attempt “to regulate all aspects
of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean.”33  The most important
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34. Id.
35. Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95
AM. J. INT’L L. 277, 278 (2001).
36. Id. at 279.
37. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
38. Id. arts. 56, 57.
39. Id. art. 76.
40. Krauss et al., supra note 10, at A1.
41. UNCLOS, supra note 37, Annex II, art. 2(1).
42. Id. art. 76(8).
features of the UNCLOS treaty include: “[n]avigational rights, territorial
sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status of resources on the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage of ships through narrow
straits, conservation and management of living marine resources, protection
of the marine environment, . . . [and] a binding procedure for settlement of
disputes between States . . . .”34
The substantive range of the UNCLOS treaty is broader than any other
lawmaking treaty, containing provisions on “defense and international
security, trade and communications, management of living and nonliving
resources, scientific research, preservation of cultural heritage, and human
rights.”35  Its primary function is to “lay down basic substantive principles
and rules regarding the rights and duties of states concerning the sea.”36
Under UNCLOS, the “sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond
its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic
State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea.”37  UNCLOS gives
each coastal State the sovereign rights to natural resources and certain
economic activities in its exclusive economic zone, which comprises the
area of sea extending as far as 200 nautical miles from the State’s coast.38
Each State that wants to establish outer limits of its continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast must make a submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), though the
limits must still be within 350 nautical miles of its coast.39  For a
submission to be accepted, a State must essentially show that the territory
it is claiming is a “natural prolongation of its continental shelf.”40  A State
must make its submission to the CLCS within ten years of ratifying
UNCLOS.  It is then reviewed by the CLCS’s twenty-one-member body of
experts in geology, geophysics, and hydrography,41 who make final and
binding recommendations to the coastal State as to the outer limits of its
continental shelf.42
States seeking to make a claim for the extension of their continental
shelves into the Arctic region under UNCLOS Article 76 are in a unique
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43. Krauss et al., supra note 10, at A1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The Arctic States are those nations that, in conjunction with Arctic indigenous
populations, are members of the Arctic Council.  The Arctic Council, established in 1996,
is a “high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation,
coordination and interaction among the Arctic States . . . in particular issues of sustainable
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”  The Arctic Council, supra note
3.
47. The other three Arctic States are Iceland, Sweden, and Finland.  Id.
48. Jarashow, Runnels & Svenson, supra note 2, at 1595.  Russia claimed that 1.2 million
square kilometers of the Artic was Russian territory, including the North Pole.  Id.
49. C.J. Chivers, Eyeing Future Wealth, Russians Plant the Flag on the Arctic Seabed,
Below the Polar Cap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at A8.
50. Id.  Russia ratified UNCLOS in 1997, which means it made its 2001 submission to
the CLCS six years before its 2007 deadline.  UNCLOS was ratified by Norway in 1996,
situation, as much of the Arctic has never been surveyed.43  This absence
of scientific data has led many of the Arctic States in recent years to send
teams of scientists and mapping expeditions to stake out whatever claims
they can to Arctic territory.44  Their objective is to provide the CLCS with
as much raw data as they can obtain to support their claims.45  Although
UNCLOS currently stands as the prevailing legal authority controlling
Arctic claims, as will be discussed in Part III, it falls short of providing the
extent of authority needed to govern this distinctive region.
II. NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND LEGAL CLAIMS
There are eight Arctic States,46 but only five have coastlines bordering
the Arctic Ocean: Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and
Norway.47  Each of these five States has staked legal claim to territory in
the Arctic based on historical claims of discovery and use, effective
occupation, national identity, geographic proximity, Native use, and
scientific data.  The nations’ overlapping claims and varied legal positions
support the need for a new legal framework under an Arctic treaty.
A.  The Russian Perspective
Russia was the first State to make a submission under UNCLOS Article
76 to the CLCS, staking a claim to more than half the Arctic in December
2001.48  Russia has had a long practice of exploration and extraction in the
polar region and has had research stations on the Arctic ice since early
Soviet times.49  This lengthy, active presence in the region may explain
Russia’s ability to make such an early submission to the CLCS.50  One of
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Canada in 2003, Denmark in 2004, and has yet to be ratified by the United States.  United
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Declarations and Statements,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2009).
51. The Lomonosov Ridge is an underwater structure that runs across the Arctic Ocean
and passes under the North Pole.  The Mendeleev Ridge is an underwater ridge extending
from the Siberian Shelf to central areas of the Arctic Ocean.
52. Marc Benitah, Russia’s Claim in the Arctic and the Vexing Issue of Ridges in
UNCLOS, 11 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INSIGHT, Nov. 2007, available at http://www
.asil.org/insight071108.cfm.
53. Id.
54. Id.  The CLCS’s deliberations and recommendations are also confidential.  Id.
55. Id.
56. Krauss et al., supra note 10, at A1.
57. Richard A. Lovett, Russia’s Arctic Claim Backed by Rocks, Officials Say, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007//09/
070921-arctic-russia.html.
58. Id.
Russia’s central claims was that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges51
are extensions of the Eurasian continent.52  The CLCS neither rejected nor
accepted Russia’s submission, but rather recommended that Russia conduct
further research and revise its submission.53  Because submissions to the
CLCS are confidential, the provisions invoked by Russia in its claim for the
extension of its continental shelf under UNCLOS are unknown.54
Since its 2001 submission, Russia has made further geological findings
regarding the ridges for the Commission’s consideration the next time it
meets, which will be in 2009.55  In August 2005, Russia dispatched the first
ship to reach the North Pole without the aid of an icebreaker.56  In
September 2007, Russia’s Natural Resources Ministry issued a statement
that its scientists confirmed, after a preliminary assessment, that the crust
of the Lomonosov Ridge is made up of the same rock as found on
continental shelves, as opposed to that found in mid-ocean seabeds.57  This
finding, if substantiated, strengthens Russia’s claim that the Ridge is part
of the Russian continental shelf, rather than Danish or Canadian territory
or the province of no State at all.58
While Russia’s submission to the CLCS is demonstrative of its policy
of working within the UNCLOS legal framework, other actions taken by
Russia suggest that it may resort to other measures if its submission proves
unsuccessful.  One such action transpired on August 2, 2007, when Russia
planted its national flag on the Arctic seafloor not far from the North Pole.
This act was described as a “symbolic move to enhance the [Russian]
government’s disputed claim to nearly half of the floor of the Arctic Ocean
2009] An Arctic Treaty 315
59. Chivers, supra note 49, at A8.
60. Robert J. Miller, Finders Keepers in the Arctic?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at 19.
Exercising the Doctrine of Discovery, nations would declare their divine right to empty land,
or land inhabited by indigenous peoples, under the notion of “first-come, first-served
discovery.”  Id.; see also Jason Warren Howard, Note, Don’t Be Left Out in the Cold: An
Argument for Advancing American Interests in the Arctic Outside the Ambits of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 42 GA. L. REV. 833, 841-42 (2008).
61. Chivers, supra note 49, at A8. 
62. Kazimierz Grzybowski, Comment, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean
Conflicts: Does UNCLOS III Point the Way?, 46 LAW &CONTEMP.PROBS. 205, 205 (1983).
63. Leonid Timtchenko, The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present, 50
ARCTIC 29, 29 (1996).
64. Macneill, supra note 15, at 377.
65. Jacobson, supra note 12, at 320-21.
66. Timtchenko, supra note 63, at 34.
and potential oil or other resources there.”59  Many described the act as
reminiscent of the claims made by European and American explorers in the
fifteenth through the twentieth centuries under the Doctrine of Discovery.60
A member of Russia’s lower house of parliament present in one of the
submarines that planted the flag stated, “[o]ur task is to remind the world
that Russia is a great Arctic and scientific power.”61  Another question
regarding Russia’s adherence to UNCLOS is whether it will adhere to the
binding settlement dispute and arbitration clauses mandated by the treaty.
When UNCLOS was ratified, Russia was still part of the Soviet Union, and
the Soviet Union had a history of not accepting compulsory jurisdiction for
arbitral or judicial settlement of disputes.62
Furthermore, historically, Russia and Canada are the only two Arctic
nations that have established legislation based on the “sector theory,”
which divides the Arctic into sectors belonging to the Arctic States.63
Under the sector theory, “polar [S]tates are entitled to exercise sovereignty
between their mainland territory and the North Pole in an area of longitude
running from their east and west coasts to the Pole.”64  The sector theory
“depends upon a characterization of the Arctic Ocean as exceptional and
deserving treatment different from that applied to the rest of the world
ocean.”65  Though Russia (then the Soviet Union) “has never considered the
limits of the Arctic sector as national boundaries,” its limits under the
Soviet sector were used when negotiating with the United States and
Norway regarding the eastern and western delimitation of its continental
shelf and exclusive economic zones.66  Thus, though Russia has ratified
UNCLOS and is currently operating within its framework, should it be
unsuccessful in gaining sovereignty over a satisfactory portion of the Arctic
under UNCLOS, it is not clear what position Russia, as successor of the
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67. Id.
68. Natalia Loukacheva,Legal Challenges in the Arctic3, Position Paper for the 4th NRF
Open Assembly, Oct.5-8, 2006 (e.g., the U.S. super-tanker, the S.S. Manhattan, in 1969 and
1970; the U.S. icebreaker, the Polar Sea, in 1986; and a U.S. nuclear submarine in 2005).
69. Donald Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A Reassessment,
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 331, 332 (1993).
70. Macneill, supra note 15, at 382.
71. Id. at 366.
72. Id.  Russia’s support of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage is likely
due to the similarity between Canada’s claim and Russia’s claim over the Northeast Passage,
which also links the Atlantic and Pacific, and is located in the Russian Arctic.  Russia’s
interest in establishing its sovereignty over the Northeast Passage “is identical to Canada’s
interest in establishing sovereignty over the [Northwest Passage].”  Id.
73. Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378 (Mar. 10, 1983),
available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/31083c.htm.
Soviet Union, will take regarding the sector theory, or whether it will resort
to other methods of acquiring Arctic territory.67
B.  The American Perspective
Alaska’s coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean gives the United States
an interest in the Arctic region and its resources.  American focus in the
territorial dispute has centered on the Northwest Passage.  The United
States maintains that the Northwest Passage (the Passage) is not Canadian
territory, as the Canadians claim, but rather that the Passage is international
waters.  The United States cites occasions where foreign ships and
submarines have sailed through these waters without the Canadian
Government’s consent, or even knowledge, as support for its contention.68
Thus, the United States has not asserted a rival claim to the Passage, but
rather it maintains that the waterway should be open for international
navigation.69  Central to the position of the United States is the “funda-
mental law of the sea espousing ‘freedom of the sea,’ and the right of
innocent passage through international waters and territorial seas.”70  The
European Union has supported the American position that the Northwest
Passage is an international strait, though it has qualified that support within
the context of environmental concerns.71  Russia, on the other hand,
supports Canada’s claim of full sovereignty over the Passage.72
While the United States was instrumental in implementing UNCLOS,
President Reagan refused to sign the final treaty because of provisions
relating to deep seabed mining that he described as contrary to the interests
of the United States.73  Though the United States rejected the treaty, in
1983 it issued an Ocean Policy Statement announcing its intent to generally
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74. Id.
75. David D. Caron & Harry N. Scheiber, The United States and the 1982 Law of the Sea
Treaty, 11 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. INSIGHTS, June 11, 2007, available at
http://asil.org/insights/2007/06/insights070611.html#_edn1.
76. Krauss et al., supra note 10, at A1.
77. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Advancing U.S.
Interests in the World’s Oceans (May 15, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html.
78. The Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Ratification Questions and Answers on LOS,
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/ratification.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2008).
79. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Law of the Sea Convention (Nov. 5, 2007),
available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/nov/94622.htm.
abide by the terms of UNCLOS by “promot[ing] and protect[ing] the
oceans interests of the United States in a manner consistent with those fair
and balanced results in the Convention and international law.”74  Despite
the nation’s failure to adopt UNCLOS, the treaty has received widespread
support in the United States.  In fact, “[i]t is likely that no other treaty has
ever been so widely supported and yet failed to be put to a vote in the
Senate for such a long duration.”75  The treaty’s ratification has been
repeatedly blocked by Republican senators who maintain that ratification
of the treaty would infringe on American sovereignty.76
In May 2007, President Bush advocated for Congress to support
American accession to UNCLOS, citing its benefits to national security
interests, sovereign rights over marine areas with rights to their natural
resources, promotion of American interests in the environmental health of
the oceans, and to gain a “seat at the table when the rights that are vital to
[American] interests are debated and interpreted.”77  On November 5, 2007,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to approve the UNCLOS
treaty, which was a step toward American accession.  The treaty now
moves to the Senate, where it must receive two-thirds of the Senate vote
before it can be formally ratified by the President.78  The Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, and the Interior all strongly
support ratification by the United States.  The State Department has cited
the potential to “secure [American] sovereign rights over extensive offshore
natural resources, including substantial oil and gas resources in the Artic”
as one of the benefits of American ratification.  It further asserts that
“[j]oining the Convention is the only viable means of protecting and
maximizing [American] ocean-related interests.”79
During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Senator
Richard Lugar differentiated UNCLOS from other international treaties that
the United States has declined to join, in that “the Law of the Sea will
continue to form the basis of maritime law regardless of whether the U.S.
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Ocean, 61 J. INT’L AFFAIRS 261, 267 (2008).
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87. The Convention on the Law of the Sea, Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations,
110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Bernard H. Oxman, University of Miami School of Law
Professor).
is a party.”80  Senator Lugar cited not only the impediment to the United
States in its ability to claim an extended part of the continental shelf off the
Alaskan coast, but also the weak position the United States will be in to
oppose excessive claims to Arctic territory by other nations, particularly
Russia.81  Furthermore, if additional amendments are made to the treaty,
member countries may adopt provisions that are opposed to American
interests, with the United States powerless to contest them.82  One scholar
suggests that American support for the treaty is aimed at using membership
as “a leverage of influence, not for the sake of cooperation,” since it knows
that CLCS decisions are not enforceable.83
In 2001, when Russia made its submission to the CLCS claiming
jurisdictional rights over the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges, the United
States took the position that the submission was critically flawed.84  The
American stance is that the Mendeleev Ridge System is a volcanic feature
of oceanic origin formed on the oceanic crust, and thus “not part of any
State’s continental shelf.”85  While the United States has taken this position
in opposition of the Russian claim, it cannot oppose the submission to the
CLCS.  In fact, even if the United States were a member of UNCLOS, the
treaty makes no provisions for non-submitting States to contest another
State’s submission.86
If it ratifies UNCLOS, the United States seeks to gain “maximum
freedom to navigate and operate off foreign coasts without interference,” for
both security and economic purposes.87  If the United States does not ratify
UNCLOS, it may attempt to assert these freedoms under customary
international law.  However, its ability to do so is growing weaker, as when
coastal States extend their exclusive economic zones, “customary
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international law may . . . evolve[] in a way contrary to [American]
[i]nterests.”88  Customary law is “not universally accepted, evolves based on
State practice, and does not provide access to the Convention’s procedural
mechanisms, such as the continental shelf commission.”89  The United States
may make excessive maritime claims through customary international law or
military operations, but either such approach is “less certain, more risky, and
more costly” than working under the UNCLOS framework.90
Despite it being the less favorable approach, the United Nations charter
does recognize customary international law,91 which is defined as law
resulting from “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation and is comprised of those clear and
unambiguous rules by which states, or nations, universally abide or to
which they acceded, out of a sense of legal obligation or mutual concern.”92
Therefore, it is not necessary for a State to sign a treaty for customary
international law to apply.  Customary international law is based on a
theory of State consent, and if a State consistently objects to a rule of
customary international law, it will not be bound by it.93  Traditionally,
there have been two elements required to confirm the existence of a
customary international law: “(1) a general and consistent practice by
states, and (2) opinio juris, a belief by the states that the practice in
question is either required or permitted . . . by customary international
law.”94  However, in modern times, conventions are also being considered
legitimate means of creating “customary rules of law that are binding on all
states, including nonparties.”95  In fact, conventions have become the
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prevailing source of customary international law.96   The current status of
international customary law in the Arctic is debatable, but some scholars
have argued that, to a wide extent, UNCLOS represents customary
international law.97  Should this be the case, and should UNCLOS remain
the framework of international governance of the Arctic, the United States
may be left out of the Arctic entirely.  However, if UNCLOS has not
become customary international law, the United States will be free to
contend that the Convention on the High Seas governs the dispute, allowing
it, and other states, the freedom to mine the seabed and navigate the
waters.98
Even beyond its failure to ratify UNCLOS, the United States has not
made the Arctic a high priority.  Despite its continued presence in the
region, it has spent relatively little on Arctic research and has failed to
maintain ships capable of safely navigating through polar waters.99  The
United States could significantly increase its presence in the Arctic with
“even a small increase in manpower and money.”100
C.  The Canadian Perspective
Canada is involved in two main territorial disputes: with the Danes over
Hans Island,101 and with the United States over the Northwest Passage.
Canada bases its claim to Hans Island on historic use by the Inuit
populations of the Queen Elizabeth Islands, which it contends include Hans
Island.102  However, Canada’s claim is weakened by the fact that no
Canadian Inuit have ever hunted or routinely traveled in the Hans Island
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area.103  Furthermore, as an alternative basis for sovereignty, Canada claims
that the island is Canadian territory because it was discovered by the
British, but some scholars suggest that Hans Island was actually discovered
by Americans.104  Sovereignty over this small island is coveted not only for
the potential oil reserves that may lie beneath it, but also for its location in
the center of the Kennedy Channel, which may become an important
shipping route in the future.105
Canada has also made a claim of sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage, maintaining that the Passage is historically internal waters.106  In
1985, Canada drew straight baselines107 around the Arctic islands, thereby
enclosing the coastal waters in its jurisdiction.  Canada maintains it did so
for the sole purpose of defining the boundaries of its historical internal
waters, and thus was not making any claim beyond what it contends has
always belonged to Canada.108  Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the
Passage hinges on the status of the Passage before Canada drew its straight
baselines.109  Accordingly, it must show that the Northwest Passage is not,
and has never been, considered an international strait.110  Unfortunately,
UNCLOS fails to specify the elements of an international strait, and
neglects to describe the “amount of maritime traffic necessary to meet
functionality requirements for international straits.”111
Canada claims that the Arctic Archipelago and the Northwest Passage
are as significant to its national consciousness and as integral a part of its
nationhood as the Canadian Rockies.112  However, a potential barrier to its
claim of control over the region may be the “significant American presence
in the region[, whose] . . . influence pervades the North.”113  The presence
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of American submarines in the Arctic region is “a glaring affront to
Canada’s ability to monitor and control the presence of foreign vessels in
waters [over which] it claims dominion,” and thereby weakens Canada’s
claim of control over the Arctic Archipelago.114  Though Canada has
neither the financial resources nor the military capacity to maintain the
necessary presence required to monitor and control the region,115 Canada
has taken action to assert its sovereignty over the Northwest Passage by
increasing its military presence in its waters.116
Though the Canadian military may be lacking a significant presence in
the Northwest Passage, the Inuit, Canada’s native population, have a long
history in the Passage and thus support Canada’s claim to the Passage.  The
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement pronounces Canada’s sovereignty over
the waters of the Arctic Archipelago based on Inuit use and occupancy.117
An Inuit leader testifying before a Special Joint-Committee on Canada’s
international relations affirmed Canada’s position: “Canadian Inuit have
always used the waters and the ice in winter, thereby providing Canada
with the case at international law required to secure Canadian rights.”118
In fact, archeological evidence suggests that the Inuit may have used the
Arctic waters since prehistoric time.119  Hunting in the Arctic region is
critical to the Inuit economy, and Canada’s claim to sovereignty may be
strengthened by arguments that it is seeking control of the territory to
ensure and protect the welfare of its Inuit population.120  However, despite
Inuit support of Canadian sovereignty over the passage, international law
does not specify whether indigenous populations “have the ability to
possess or transfer titles to land.”121
Simple geography provides additional support for Canada’s claim over
the Arctic Archipelago and the Northwest Passage.  The Arctic Archipelago
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is an extension of the Canadian mainland—an archipelago of the Canadian
continental shelf—rather than an independent chain of islands.122  The very
location of the Passage and the islands that make up the Arctic Archipelago
provide the most apparent support for Canadian sovereignty, and may prove
to be among Canada’s strongest arguments for sovereignty.
In response to the United States’ failure to recognize Canada’s
exclusive control over the Arctic Archipelago and the Northwest Passage,
Canada has stated that it is “prepared to uphold its position of Arctic
sovereignty in the World Court if necessary and to have the issue freely and
fully judged there.”123  Speaking in the House of Commons in 1985, the
then Secretary of State stated, 
Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible.  It embraces land,
sea, and ice.  It extends without interruption to the seaward-facing
coasts of the Arctic islands.  These islands are joined and not
divided by the waters between them. . . . The policy of this
government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic
archipelago [sic.], and to preserve Canada’s sovereignty over the
land, sea, and ice undiminished and undivided. . . . Only full
sovereignty protects the full range of Canada’s interests.  This full
sovereignty is vital to Canada’s security.  It is vital to Canada’s
Inuit people.  And it is vital even to Canada’s nationhood.124
Canada has expressed interest in cooperating with the United States and
other Arctic States with regard to the Arctic Archipelago, but “only . . . on
the basis of full respect for Canada’s sovereignty.”125
While Canada has been firm in its claim to exclusive control over these
waters, it has also indicated support for international shipping through the
Passage, so long as other States comply with Canadian regulations.126
However, the dispute over the Northwest Passage is not solely over use of
the waters for shipping purposes.  There are two further motivations for
Canada to assert its sovereignty over the Northwest Passage: its “immense
hydrocarbon reserves . . . [and] the central proximity of the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago to the [former] Soviet Union and the United States, [which]
makes [it] an area of vital strategic interest.  Indeed, the shortest distance
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between the two super powers is across the Arctic Circle.”127  Given the
value of the Arctic Archipelago’s location, Canada may try to further its
claim by making a legal argument relating to security.  It may contend that
if the Passage is determined to be international waters, other nations will
have free reign over the Passage and could send terrorist warships or
vessels carrying toxic cargo through the Passage without notification.128
Thus, Canada has a range of support for its Arctic claims, most of which
are nonscientific, and thus not likely to be useful in a submission to the
CLCS under UNCLOS.
D.  The Danish Perspective
The Danes are seeking to assert their sovereignty over two areas: Hans
Island, and the Lomonosov Ridge and North Pole.  The Danes have claimed
Hans Island through “effective occupation,” by flying the Danish flag over
the island for several years and making repeat visits to the island, but their
claim is disputed by Canada.129  Yet, unlike the Canadian Inuit, the native
populations of Greenland130 have historically hunted in the area, used it to
monitor ice floes, and have their own name for the island.131
Denmark also argues that it has the right to the Lomonosov Ridge
under UNCLOS, which would give it a claim to waters up to 370
kilometers from its baseline, and legally entitle it to exploit the shelf area
for natural resources.132  Denmark contends that the Lomonosov Ridge is
an extension of Greenland’s landmass.133  If Denmark can show that the
Ridge is Danish territory, it may have a claim to the North Pole as well.134
Just ten days after the Russians planted their flag under the North Pole,
Denmark dispatched a team of scientists to the region to look for evidence
that the Lomonosov Ridge is attached to Greenland, which would make it
a geological extension of the Arctic island.135  Denmark has indicated that
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its preliminary investigations have been “very promising” and suggestive
that “Denmark could be given the North Pole.”136
E.  The Norwegian Perspective
Norway has deep physical and psychological roots in the Arctic.137  The
Norwegians consider exploration of the Arctic a significant part of their
country’s history and influential in the formation of its national identity.138
In 2006, Norway made a submission to the CLCS claiming that its
continental shelf extends as far as eighty-four degrees, forty-one minutes
north, which is not far enough to include the North Pole.139  Other than
Russia, Norway is the only Arctic State thus far to make a submission.
Norway has stated its policy of working under the rules and legal norms of
UNCLOS and its expectation that the other Arctic States will do the
same.140  Its submission to the CLCS within its ten-year deadline is
evidence of its adherence to UNCLOS procedure.  When Russia planted its
flag at the North Pole, Norway rebuffed the Russian effort, calling it a
“symbolic act of no legal or material consequence,” as such actions have
no meaning under UNCLOS.141
Norway contends that the Arctic does not require a new legal regime,
but rather a more effective application of existing international law.142
Despite its current stance, however, Norway has also indicated that it is
“always . . . open to consider[ing] new mechanisms for cooperation.”143
The nation has “emphasized the need to structure a long-term system of
international governance for the polar region[]; [and] its scientists and
researchers [have] call[ed] for cooperation rather than competition.”144
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Norway has not only expressed its interest in collaborating with the other
Arctic States to form a stronger legal governance, it has also made a
commitment to preserving the Arctic ecosystems and environment while
ensuring the use of the Arctic’s natural resources.145  Norway has become
increasingly important to the United States in terms of American energy
policy, and Norway “welcome[s] the heft of the United States in its
negotiations with Russia.”146  Norway is eager to settle its territorial dispute
with Russia so that it may apply its standards for exploration and control
over the area.147
III. AN ARCTIC TREATY: THE SOLUTION?
While others have concluded that State ratification of, and adherence
to, UNCLOS poses the best solution to the conflicting claims over Arctic
territory,148 an Arctic treaty, if properly designed, could provide a more
optimal resolution.  An Arctic treaty has the potential to resolve not only
the competing sovereignty claims, but also additional issues unique to the
Arctic.
A.  The Antarctic Treaty as a Model?
The existing dispute over the Arctic is similar to the one that transpired
approximately fifty years ago over Antarctica.  At that time, seven
nations149 were vying for Antarctic territory.  These nations resolved their
conflicting claims through the Antarctic Treaty, thereby establishing a legal
framework of joint governance over the continent.150  The Treaty went into
effect in 1961 with the primary purpose of preserving Antarctica for
cooperative scientific investigation and also to ensure that the region only
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be used for peaceful purposes.151  It gave Antarctica “a unique international
status and provided for the creation of a distinctly regional structure of
principles and institutions.”152  The Treaty did not settle the sovereignty
disputes, but rather “froze” the claims, leaving them to be resolved at some
later, unspecified date.153  Thus, the signatories to the Treaty agreed to
suspend their territorial claims in furtherance of the Treaty’s goals.154  In
addition to suspending existing claims, the Treaty further specified that no
act taken while the Treaty is in place may constitute a basis for asserting or
denying a claim of sovereignty.155  At present, some nations believe that the
claims should remain frozen permanently, and Antarctica should become
a “global commons,” owned not by any one nation, but by all nations.156
However, the Treaty members who have agreed to freeze sovereignty
claims have repeatedly expressed steadfastness in retaining their claims.157
Despite the uncertainty over the future status of Antarctica, the Treaty has
thus far proved effective in governing the region, and a similar strategy may
also be successful in resolving the present dispute over territory in
Antarctica’s northern counterpart.
While there are many similar problems in the Arctic and Antarctic, 158
it is also critical to note the differences between the two polar regions.  The
most apparent distinction is that while Antarctica is its own continent, the
Arctic is an ocean almost completely surrounded by land, making its
boundaries more difficult to define.  Also, Antarctica has had virtually no
human activity, with the exception of scientific researchers, while the
Arctic is home to many indigenous peoples.159  The presence of these native
populations in the Arctic means there are many more interested parties in
the region than was the case with Antarctica.  The polar regions also differ
in that the Arctic plays a much greater role in processes beyond its realms,
such that environmental changes in the North can have consequences
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around the globe.160  Additionally, “[i]n the Arctic, extraction of oil, gas
and minerals, at sea and on land, is an important reality; in the Antarctic,
it is only a conjecture.”161  The vast quantities of natural resources known
to be in the Arctic present issues related not only to control over those
resources, but also to the extent to which they should be extracted.  The
value of these resources may make States with strong claims to significant
territory in the Arctic reluctant to enter into a treaty.
The Antarctic Treaty may prove less useful as a guide for an Arctic
treaty with regard to issues facing the Arctic that are unrelated to state
sovereignty.  For example, though the Antarctic Treaty authorizes parties
to the Treaty to negotiate measures “in furtherance of . . . preservation and
conservation of living resources in Antarctica,” it does not explicitly state
environmental protection as an objective of the Treaty.162  The preservation
of the Arctic environment would likely play a more pivotal role in the
formation of an Arctic treaty.  In addition, governance of the exploitation
of the natural resources of the Arctic and protection of the welfare of
indigenous populations, neither of which is addressed in the Antarctic
Treaty, will be important objectives of an Arctic treaty.  Thus, while the
Antarctic Treaty may certainly serve as a foundation for an Arctic Treaty,
it is only a starting point.
B.  An Arctic Treaty
The procedure prescribed by UNCLOS, the international legal
framework under which most Arctic nations are currently operating, could
potentially prove effective in resolving the present dispute over Arctic
territory, but there are many more issues facing the region that call for a
new international agreement.  A comprehensive treaty would be a more
effective means of resolving not just the jurisdictional controversy, but also
further concerns unique to the Arctic, including the environment, national
security, management and exploitation of natural resources, Inuit interests,
and governance of waterway usage.  The issues arising in the Arctic, due
to its unique icy makeup, cannot all be addressed within the UNCLOS
framework, whose principles and legal norms were developed for
governance of open water, not glacial masses.163
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[An Arctic treaty] could arrange for sustainable development of
Arctic resources, do the seafloor mapping that’s needed to sort out
the conflicting territorial claims, develop shipping shortcuts
through the northern passages, set technological standards for ships
that navigate the icy waters and guard the welfare of the more than
one million indigenous people living within the Arctic Circle.164
A new international governance under an Arctic treaty could therefore be
a first step in developing the newly accessible Arctic, while also preserving
the environment and the welfare of its native populations.
With regard to claims of territorial sovereignty, an Arctic treaty might
approach the issue in one of three ways: (1) divide the Arctic among the
States based on some formula agreed upon by the States; (2) direct that the
territorial division will be determined under UNCLOS procedure; or (3)
like the Antarctic Treaty, freeze all State territorial claims.  The first option
for dividing the Arctic is improbable, as the current dispute exists for the
very reason that the States cannot agree.  The next option is also unlikely
so long as the United States refuses to ratify the UNCLOS treaty.  The
United States is not apt to agree to an Arctic treaty that resolves the dispute
through the UNCLOS process if it remains unable to participate within its
framework.  However, were the United States to ratify UNCLOS, such an
approach may prove effective.  Within this option, an Arctic treaty could
indicate that UNCLOS is to govern the States’ sovereignty claims while
other provisions of the treaty could address the concerns unique to the
Arctic not covered by UNCLOS.  States, such as Russia, who have already
begun working under the laws of UNCLOS, would likely favor this
approach, as they will be able to continue in the UNCLOS process of
submitting claims to the CLCS.  By establishing UNCLOS as the governing
law, the Arctic States will be bound by the determinations made by the
CLCS, and left without alternatives under, for example, customary law.
However, even were the United States to ratify UNCLOS, this approach is
potentially problematic because the CLCS has no actual authority to settle
disputes or enforce its recommendations.  Thus, should more than one State
claim the same territory, as will inevitably occur, it is unclear how the
Commission will proceed.165  Claims made by one State are subject to
counter-claims by other States, and while the CLCS’s recommendations are
“binding,” the body has no power to enforce them.166
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Thus, the most favorable approach is to freeze all claims to Arctic
territory, at least until there has been more scientific study of the region.
Under the terms of an Arctic treaty, the States could prescribe extensive
mapping of the sea floor, which would likely resolve many of the
conflicting territorial claims, as they exist largely due to a lack of scientific
information on the region.  A major benefit of this approach is that, as was
the case with Antarctica, States would agree that scientific exploration,
peace, and preservation of the fragile ecosystems of the Arctic region are
more important than their claims to sovereignty. 
An Arctic treaty should also address permissible activity within the
region.  It is essential that the treaty resolve the acceptable level of resource
extraction, if allowed at all, in consideration of the consequences to the
environment and native populations.  While UNCLOS may be an effective
alternative in determining the jurisdictional limits of the Arctic States, once
those boundaries are delineated, it lacks the mechanisms to control what the
States do within the realm of their respective territories.  While “[e]xclud-
ing others from exploitation of the shelf’s resources is an essential element
of a State’s jurisdiction over conduct on the shelf,” it does not necessarily
follow that a State should be able to develop the area within its bounds.167
Though UNCLOS broadly calls on coastal States to protect the marine
environment, it lacks any enforcement mechanism.168  An Arctic treaty
could establish limits to exploitation of the Arctic natural resources, and
institute other environmental standards to preserve the natural landscape
and indigenous populations that currently inhabit the region.  Such
provisions are critical, as the ecosystem of the Arctic has been described as
“more finely tuned and acutely sensitive to environmental impact than . . .
any other part of the globe.”169  Because Arctic ecosystems are so fragile
and have lengthy recovery periods, any pollution or contamination of the
environment could have ruinous effects, especially given “the increased
difficulty in cleaning-up the Arctic environment due to the frigid, icy
weather conditions.”170  Not only is accidental pollution, such as oil spills,
a serious concern, but so is pollution caused by the constant routine passage
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of ships through the region’s waters.171  It is critical to the marine
environment that the international community “regulate the [Arctic]
environment by preventing oil spillage and other despoliation of the Arctic
Ocean.”172  Without such an agreement, a lack of oversight of a State’s
activities within its jurisdiction could lead to drastic consequences in the
Arctic and worldwide.   Furthermore, if the treaty is to allow some resource
extraction, it also should address who profits from those resources.  Not
only do the Arctic States have an interest in profiting from the region’s rich
energy resources, but the indigenous Arctic populations have also indicated
their desire to share in the proceeds if extraction is to be allowed.173
While the prospect of attaining access to the Arctic’s valuable natural
resources may pose a challenge to an international agreement, past
cooperation amongst the Arctic States provides hope that an Arctic treaty
is attainable.  The United States and Canada have already forged the Arctic
Cooperation Agreement in acknowledgement of the need to “cooperate in
advancing their shared interests in Arctic navigation, development and
security,” while remaining sensitive to the Arctic’s unique environment and
its native populations.174  Likewise, in 2005, Canada and Denmark reached
an agreement for managing Hans Island, while the two States continue to
pursue their claims of the small land mass.175  They have also undertaken
a joint surveying project of the Arctic area near their coasts.176  In 1996, the
eight Arctic States established the Arctic Council, which was designed to
promote cooperation among the Arctic States.  While the Arctic Council is
demonstrative of the States’ ability to cooperate, it cannot serve the same
function as an Arctic treaty since it has been delegated negligible power
and its laws have no binding effect on the Arctic States.177  To date, “the
most the Arctic Council has been able to do . . . has been to adopt
guidelines and recommendations on how the Arctic [S]tates should apply
their [individual State] regulations in [Arctic] areas.”178  Thus, while States
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have undertaken collaborative approaches to the Arctic, there continues to
be a need for binding international law in the Arctic.   
In addition to requiring the Arctic States to freeze, at least temporarily,
their claims to Arctic territory, an Arctic treaty will also need to address use
of Arctic waterways while claims are frozen.  The Northwest Passage
provides an obvious example.  If the Canadian claim that the Passage is
internal waters—and thus closed to foreign vessels—and the American
claim that the Passage constitutes international waters— whereby foreign
vessels are entitled to exercise normal freedoms of navigation—are both
“frozen,” it is not readily apparent whether foreign vessels are to be
permitted to use the strait.179  One way an Arctic treaty could manage use
of the Northwest Passage is to allow Canada to exercise sovereignty over
the Passage while also permitting international navigation through the
Passage.  Thus, the treaty could allow Canada’s sovereignty claim to
remain intact, while also allowing for navigation based on UNCLOS
provisions regarding transit passage through international straits.180
Accordingly, both States would be able to achieve their objectives in the
short term while maintaining their contrary positions.
In addition to addressing conflicting territorial sovereignty claims and
preservation of the Arctic environment, an Arctic treaty should also address
security concerns.  Like the Antarctic Treaty,181 a treaty in the Arctic should
express that the Arctic shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Additionally, it is critical that an Arctic treaty include: provisions for
enforcement, penalties for signatories who breach its terms, and a provision
for dispute resolution.182
Thus, an Arctic treaty is the most optimal framework for Arctic
governance, as it is has the potential to address the wide range of issues that
face this distinctive region, and assure future cooperation among the States.
The rapidity with which the Arctic is melting and the approaching State
deadlines imposed by UNCLOS for CLCS submissions demand that the
States work on developing a treaty now.  Representatives of the five Arctic
States met most recently in Ilulissat, Greenland, in May 2008, at which time
they issued a joint declaration acknowledging the changing conditions of
the Arctic due to climate change.183  The declaration also indicated an
intention and commitment to continued Arctic governance under
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UNCLOS.184  In apparent response to the growing criticism of that
approach, the declaration stressed the five States’ commitment to coope-
rating with each other, and concluded, “We therefore see no need to
develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the
Arctic Ocean.”185  The Arctic States’ adherence to the UNCLOS frame-
work, however, is fraught with the potential for future conflict as issues
arise for which the treaty has not provided.  The time to develop an Arctic
treaty is now, while the States are expressing a commitment to cooperation,
and before any one State gains an advantage over the others by successfully
securing sovereignty over a portion of the Arctic.  Because of the
uncertainty as to the strength of each State’s claim, and the risk to each that
sovereignty may be denied it in favor of another State, it would be in each
State’s best interest to enter into an Arctic treaty now to assure its
continuing role in governance of the region.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the opening of shorter navigational routes and the increasing
accessibility of natural resources, including oil, coal, and gas, may be
advantageous to the economies of the Arctic States, the melting of the polar
ice caps will also result in global and regional climate changes, increased
sea levels worldwide, and detrimental consequences for the Arctic
environment and its native marine populations, which are of vital
significance to the rest of the world.186  Much of the dispute over territory
in the Arctic stems from uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge and
scientific data regarding this long-overlooked region of the world.  Each of
the five Arctic States asserting claims to the region are doing so on a
variety of bases, from historical claims to scientific claims, unsure of which
will prove effective under international law.  While UNCLOS has been the
international legal framework utilized in the Arctic to date, it will be
insufficient in addressing all the concerns that plague the Arctic, regardless
of whether the United States ratifies the treaty.  The Arctic requires its own
system of governance that can address its unique features, as “[n]o one
wins if the region remains a lawless frontier.”187  The Arctic is too valuable
and too significant to processes throughout the world to allow it to remain
unregulated.  If the sovereignty dispute is somehow resolved through
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UNCLOS or some other process without an Arctic treaty in place, the entire
world will be at the mercy of a few States.  Whichever States gain
sovereignty rights will be free to fully exploit the region with the rest of the
world helpless to stop them.  An Arctic treaty, however, can strike a
balance between preserving the Arctic of yesterday and developing the
Arctic of tomorrow.
